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Self-Determination’s Next Battleground?
Vojvodina, Serbia’s ethnically diverse northern province, has received far less attention than other parts of the former
Yugoslavia. Yet, although the province has been relatively calm
throughout the 1990s, it mirrors the structural problems
confronting Serbia and the region in important ways. The West’s
efforts to achieve a settlement in Kosovo will have a profound impact
in areas as seemingly stable as Vojvodina, where calls for autonomy
are mounting.
To achieve what they view as a positive outcome in Kosovo,
Western policymakers have adopted rhetorical and legal positions
that will define and limit their policy options in the future. In
Vojvodina, calls for autonomy by local Serbs and ethnic Hungarians
will force the international community to defend and refine the
postures it has adopted in Kosovo.
What are the terms by which the international community
could evaluate autonomy for Vojvodina—or for any other distinct
territory or population within a state? Would it be an issue of self-
determination? In the classical theory of self-determination as it
developed during the period of decolonization, the multi-ethnic
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nature of a territory, its history, and its level of internal democratic
participation1  did not affect a claim. It is unlikely that Vojvodina
could meet the classical standard,2  but neither does Kosovo.
These elements have, however, always been implicit in self-
determination thinking, challenging the comfortable convention
that the right could be reduced to a rule of “salt water and brown
skin.” In the fluid post-Cold War environment, the classical
conception sounds increasingly hollow.3  Claims for autonomy can
be asserted on many interrelated grounds, each of which is
fundamentally indeterminate, yielding multiple, contradictory
conclusions that can only be resolved through an act of preferential
policymaking. When the period of fluidity ends, however, those
preferential choices will have defined the standards for a new era in
self-determination.
To the degree that the West’s preferred solutions in Kosovo are
grounded in international legal principles, consistent application of
those principles may compel recognition of similar outcomes in
Vojvodina—yet this is a result few parties desire. Apart from some
local Serbs, ethnic Hungarians and other minorities in Vojvodina,
and the government of Hungary, almost no significant party
supports an extensive grant of autonomy or other political
reconfiguration in Vojvodina, and several states have clearly
expressed their oppostion.4  Western leaders will have to distinguish
these claims; in so doing, they will shape the course of self-
determination. Vojvodina may well prove a conceptual battleground,
if not a real one.
Actual conflict is not out of the question. Though a complete
breakdown remains unlikely, observers speculate about the possibility
of civil war. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is only 70 percent
Serb, and minorities predominate in the north, south, and on both
sides of the border between its constituent republics of Serbia and
Montenegro. Kosovo has been effectively (though not legally)
separated from Serbia, but ethnic clashes continue in the north, and
renewed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) activity has been reported in
ethnically Albanian areas of Serbia outside Kosovo.5  Politically, there
are divisions as well: Montenegro’s leadership is locked in struggle
with the Milosevic regime, and is moving towards independence.
Within Serbia, a system consistently biased against minorities
encourages their entrenchment in the political opposition. Framing
this divisive environment in Vojvodina in particular is the
recollection of a period of strong autonomy and a feeling of cultural
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separateness from Serbia south of the Danube and Sava rivers. Many
outcomes are possible, but claims for autonomy or independence for
various parts of Yugoslavia will continue to be made.
This article asks how the West could respond to claims for self-
determination in Vojvodina consistently with its policies in Kosovo.
As the case of Vojvodina shows, the defining characteristic of self-
determination today is its indeterminacy, which allows policymakers
to pursue a broader range of policies than was possible in the era of
decolonization. Their policies are only limited by the ability of states
to define their actions consistently with their past practice or to claim
new rhetorical ground in the name of self-determination.
Background Fragments: Peoples, Lands, and States
Settled by colonists from across the Habsburg lands as well as by
Serbs moving north as the Ottoman Empire withdrew south of the
Danube and Sava rivers, Vojvodina became one of the most multi-
ethnic regions of Europe. During the nineteenth century, the area
was a center for the Serbian national renaissance. Following the First
World War, partly as a consequence of Woodrow Wilson’s advocacy
of self-determination, Vojvodina and Serbia were joined within the
new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later renamed
Yugoslavia.6
Dramatic population shifts occurred during and after the
Second World War: the large German population fled or was expelled
en masse, and southern Serbs and Montenegrins were settled in the
region. By 1991 Vojvodina was still mixed but predominantly Serb.7
With the influx of Serb refugees and the outflow of Croats and
Hungarians in the 1990s, Vojvodina may now be as much as 70
percent Serb.
Following the Second World War, both Vojvodina and Kosovo
were made autonomous provinces within Serbia. Vojvodina became
a showcase of multiethnic governance; the province had five official
languages.8  At first, autonomy did not translate into meaningful
political control in either province, but from the 1970s onwards,
Vojvodina and Kosovo were increasingly governed by local and
ethnic cadres and attained an independent role in the federal
structure.9
In 1981, after the death of Yugoslavia’s postwar leader Josip
Broz Tito, some Albanians began calling for republican status for
Kosovo, while some Serbs called for Belgrade to reassert control over
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the two provinces.10  Vojvodina, and even more so Kosovo, became
major issues in the ascent of Slobodan Milosevic in the 1980s.11  In
October 1988, as part of the “Anti-bureaucratic Revolution,” protests
controlled by Milosevic ousted Vojvodina’s (mostly Serb)
leadership.12  Kosovo’s government fell shortly thereafter, and both
provinces were subordinated to Belgrade.
The Milosevic government’s centralization of power affected the
cultural rights of minorities, as well as their access to education and
work; the arrival of Serb refugees from Yugoslavia’s other wars
further increased the pressure on minorities in Vojvodina.13
Throughout the 1990s, Kosovo was subjected to repressive rule,
erupting in a wave of ethnic cleansing this past year. In Vojvodina,
where Belgrade’s rule was less harsh but still resented, there is
increasingly broad agreement that autonomy should be restored, but
what does that agreement mean?
Claims to Autonomy: Unified Goal or Means to Different
Ends?
Serbia is experiencing pressures for decentralization from diverse
communities and polities. In Vojvodina, this pressure is expressed in
a unique way. There, autonomy is favored by members of all classes
and ethnic backgrounds. Beyond this common sentiment, however,
there is considerable divergence about what autonomy should mean.
Hungarian Claims
Both major ethnic Hungarian parties and four minor ones have made
proposals for restoring provincial autonomy and developing novel
personal and territorial autonomy for Hungarians,14  the most radical
proposals in Vojvodina today.
Personal autonomy, though ill defined, would be regulated
through an authority elected by the whole Hungarian community in
Vojvodina, and would aim to protect the 40 percent of Hungarians
living outside the core Hungarian areas. In areas with sizable
Hungarian minorities outside the core, the second form, local
autonomy, would guarantee bilingual municipal government and
services.15  The relationship between these municipal governments
and the “personal autonomy authority” is poorly developed.
The key demand, however, is for territorial autonomy: a
Hungarian autonomous area in northern Vojvodina, where
Hungarian would be the default language for government and
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education. Budgetary control for many functions, including public
security, would be vested in an autonomous authority. The area
would, in effect, be a Hungarian province within Vojvodina. Serbs’
rights would be guaranteed in the same way
that Hungarians’ rights would be
guaranteed elsewhere, that is they would be
a minority eligible to form a personal
autonomy authority. One observer provides
these examples of the kinds of autonomy:
posting local council decisions in a minority
language (local autonomy), managing
cultural funds in areas with a large minority
population (territorial autonomy), and
participating in elections for minority representatives regardless of
residence (personal autonomy).16  The proposals actually embrace
four levels of autonomy, because the three forms would be realized
within the context of renewed provincial autonomy.
These proposals, first made in 1992, were flatly rejected by the
Serbian parliament. During the NATO bombing campaign, the
Hungarian community in Vojvodina kept a low profile.17  After its
conclusion, however, with the West backing autonomy in Kosovo,
Vojvodina’s Hungarians renewed their calls. Hungary has come out
in support of their claims, and pressed the status of Vojvodina’s
Hungarians in the conference overseeing the Balkans Stability Pact.
Sympathy extends beyond Hungary: the former NATO
commander General Wesley Clark caused a furor when he opined that
the Trianon treaty (setting the borders of Austria-Hungary’s
successor states) was outdated and could not be a shield for
oppressing minorities.18  The United States quickly issued
reinterpretations,19  and no one supposes that the general’s isolated
comments represent a shift in NATO policy. Amid the spin control,
however, hardly anyone criticized Hungary’s baseline support for
ethnic Hungarian autonomy in a neighbor state.20  Much has
changed since the early 1990s when Hungary’s then prime minister
Jozsef Antall paralyzed regional relations by declaring that he was the
“spiritual prime minister” of all Hungarians.21
Serb Claims
Two overlapping groupings of Serbs also favor autonomy: “old”
Serbs and members of the political opposition. There are serious
social cleavages between “old” Serbs, whose ancestors arrived in early
Vojvodina may
prove to be a
c o n c e p t u a l
battleground, if
not a real one.
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waves of colonization, and “new” Serbs, settled in Vojvodina following
the Second World War; many  “old” Serbs believe they have been
disenfranchised by Belgrade.22  They thus support autonomy as a way
of shoring up their position vis-à-vis the “new” Serbs.
In addition, Serb opponents of the Milosevic regime favor
autonomy for pragmatic or ideological reasons. This grouping
includes former provincial functionaries (who see autonomy as
weakening Belgrade) and unreformed Yugoslavists (for whom
decentralization was a foundation stone of the late communist
order). The programs of oppositionists and “old” Serbs overlap
considerably: both focus on economic issues, seeking to restore
autonomous control over provincial budgets so that Vojvodina’s
wealth is not siphoned off to subsidize the poorer Serbian south.
Other Claims
Other minorities favor autonomy as well. The Democratic Alliance of
Croats of Vojvodina supports restored autonomy in cultural affairs,
the Slovaks have voiced dissatisfaction, and all minorities benefited
in the old system.23  Some non-ethnic parties, such as the Reformists
of Vojvodina–Social Democratic Party, and the League of Social
Democrats of Vojvodina, also favor regionalization or autonomy.
Disagreement on Ultimate Goals
In May 1996, seventeen parties signed a “Manifesto for Vojvodina
Autonomy.” All of them support autonomy, but their political goals,
bases of support, and ideological visions differ radically. Pro-
autonomy Serbs argue for pan-Vojvodina autonomy, and accuse
Hungarians of ethnic particularism.24  Hungarian leaders fear they
will be pawns in a struggle between local and Belgrade Serbs if they
accept provincial autonomy;25 indeed, one Hungarian noted, “I don’t
agree…that ‘we’re all Vojvodinans.’ Serbs only bring that up when they
have a problem.”26  Yet even among themselves, Hungarians have not
agreed on a unified platform.27
The coalition has been under strain. Expelled Serbian
parliamentary members, for instance, charge that it has been co-
opted by Milosevic, and recently some of its members have called for
extraordinary provincial elections while others oppose them.28
Beyond that, however, its members’ diverging visions of autonomy
have also limited its effectiveness. While groups with differing
agendas can cooperate to represent a diverse polity, when the issue is
not about policy choices but about the very order within which those
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choices are made, the level of scrutiny should be high indeed.
In Kosovo, the international community seems increasingly
hapless in its search for Albanians who support autonomy instead of
independence. It will lose the struggle in the long run, and then it will
begin to look for legal and rhetorical cover for its about-face. Its
choice of rhetoric will limit its options in the next crisis. In Vojvodina,
local groups have generated support for a generally worded claim to
autonomy. How would the international community assess that
claim, if it had to? Ought it, can it, accord any level of recognition to
such a claim? At what stage must it?
The Indeterminate Right: Bases for Evaluating Claims to Self-
Determination
The evaluation of claims to self-determination in Vojvodina, as in any
territory integrated into a sovereign state, must first account for the
doctrinal and political parameters of self-determination as they have
developed from the modern doctrine’s origins, through the phase of
decolonization.
It is generally accepted that the modern doctrine finds its
origins in Woodrow Wilson’s advocacy of self-determination for
ethnic groups on the territory of the defeated Central Powers after the
First World War.29  Wilson’s proposals explicitly favored realignment
of territorial control around existing ethnic groups, rather than
subordination of those groups to different sovereigns. The core of
Wilson’s proposals formed the “interlocking elements of the post-
war settlement: (1) a scheme whereby identifiable people were to be
accorded Statehood; (2) the fate of disputed border areas was to be
decided by plebiscite; and (3) those ethnic groups too small or too
dispersed to be eligible for either…were to benefit from the protection
of special minorities regimes….”30  In accord with these principles, new
states were established in Central and Eastern Europe, but Wilson’s
schema was only imperfectly applied even on the territories of the
defeated Central Powers—where large ethnic populations were
separated from their kin states and the minority rights regimes
which were supposed to protect these groups were not enforced—and
it was almost universally ignored in the empires of the victorious
Allies.
The rhetorical attraction of the principle was more difficult to
ignore. After the Second World War, the principle of self-
determination was enshrined as a core right of the international
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order; it was soon invoked as a justification for the systematic
liberation of colonial territories.31  But its application in the colonial
context was quite different from its Wilsonian form: in attaining
independence,32  colonial peoples exercised their right to self-
determination within existing colonial boundaries, without reference
to the ethnic, linguistic, or cultural characteristics of the
population.33  Nonetheless, this colonial model became the standard—
indeed, self-determination came to be identified as a right pertaining
only to colonial peoples.34
Even during the height of decolonialization, there were
glimmerings of a broader application, including references in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to self-
determination as a right of all peoples, and its potential, suggested by
the 1970 “Declaration on Friendly Relations,” to promote or even
require democratic forms of governance.35  Since the end of the Cold
War, mainstream discussion of self-determination has focused on its
internal aspects, advocating a deconstruction of the right so that it
might be afforded to non-colonial groups, while simultaneously
avoiding the disaggregative and potentially destabilizing effects on
existing states that a full claim to self-determination could entail.36
A systematic extension of the classical right, as enjoyed by colonial
peoples, to all peoples howsoever defined, is seldom advocated.37  As a
matter of doctrine, extension of the right to “minorities” is expressly
limited by Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which accords cultural, religious, and linguistic rights to individual
members of minorities, but no right of autonomy to the minority
itself.38  In fundamental ways, the orthodoxy of self-determination
has long outlived the completion of decolonization itself.
Yet claims are being asserted, in the name of self-determination,
by groups far outside the classical conception. The fluidity
introduced by the end of the Cold War has simultaneously
encouraged the assertion of claims on novel grounds and made
canonical dismissal of them sound hollow. How are claims such as
those raised in Kosovo and Vojvodina to be measured? The bases the
international community chooses will determine the scope of self-
determination in the Balkans and beyond, once the doors of doctrine
are sealed again, and a new orthodoxy proclaimed.
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Democratic Bases: Determining the People, Determining the
People’s Will
The rhetoric of national liberators often speaks of the “will of the
people” in monolithic terms. Reality is far more complicated; often,
the “will of the people” is expressed within a narrow, elite range, at the
expense of other wills and interests. Yet, for the political actor who
wishes to ground his policies in a legal doctrine or rhetoric, an
understanding of that will and its components is valuable. Indeed, it
is essential to any evaluation of internal or external self-
determination.
The concept of a “people” is ill-defined. One important
indicator is the 1998 “Quebec Reference,” in which Canada’s
Supreme Court addressed possible secession by Quebec.39  The Court
accepted, almost in passing, that a “people” can be something other
than the population of a state, even suggesting that it need not
correspond to any existing political demarcation.40  This is far indeed
from the concept of a “people” come down to us from
decolonization—and compels the conclusion that the new
determining standard must account for ethnic characteristics.41  As
the Court suggests, a purely deracinated policy of democratization
fails to address the critical question of how one determines the
relevant polity within which democracy is exercised. The genius of
Wilsonian self-determination is its recognition that a democratic and
free society requires not a population, but a polity. There is no ideal
polity in which all members’ interests join and which excludes no one
who shares in those interests.42  Yet it stands to reason—if only
because interests are to a large extent defined by identity—that
populations that share some objective or subjective characteristics
will come closer to that ideal, will find more of their interests in
common, than would populations sharing only territorial
proximity.43
Only a polity can rightly constitute a people. Classic self-
determination, however, accorded that legal status to mere
populations, and satisfied itself with delineating those populations,
without reference to their composition or interests, to make the stuff
of states. Wilsonian self-determination and its modern progeny seen
in the heterodox claims of disparate ethnic groups demand instead
that the delineation of the state await a determination of (and by) a
people.44
In Vojvodina, determining “the people” is complicated by the
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province’s ethnic stratification, which precludes a facile
majoritarianism.45  Serbs predominate in the south and east, and are
present throughout Vojvodina. Hungarians predominate in the
north. Smaller minorities form majorities in discrete communities.
Yet, one could probably identify a pro-autonomy polity including all
minorities and a majority of Serbs. Is this sufficient to rest a claim?
Perhaps, but it only masks the deeper problem: not who the people
are, but what they want.
An analogous problem obtained in the 1992 Bosnian
referendum. Although few observers supposed that support for
independence meant the same thing to both the Croats and Muslims
who participated, the referendum
provided the basis for the international
community’s recognition of Bosnia’s
independence.46  Within little more than a
year of the vote in which those two
peoples supposedly expressed their will in
a way cognizable to the international
community, they were at war.
In Vojvodina, too, widespread
sentiment for autonomy masks
fundamental underlying disagreements.
Many Hungarians want ethnic
autonomy; many Serbs want provincial
economic autonomy. Some Hungarians
view autonomy as a step toward reunion
with Hungary; no Serbs support that goal. How then does the outside
observer assess support for autonomy?
It is possible to say that whatever disparate groups agree upon
represents their will, but this has little explanatory, let alone
prescriptive, power. Worse, it ignores the reality that some policies are
embedded in a politics of process—they exist as movement toward
some further goal. It is sometimes prudent to set aside difficult
questions, but core questions may still be unaddressed when final
status deadlines have come and gone. To ignore ultimate
disagreements about the ends groups desire—indeed, to grant the
international community’s imprimatur while ignoring those
disagreements—seems foolish.
The genius of
Wilsonian self-
de terminat ion
was recognizing
that a democratic
society requires
not a population,
but a polity.
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Territorial Bases: The People’s Land or the Land’s People?
The problem of identifying the people in Vojvodina is in significant
part a function of the decision to view the area as a necessary unit of
territory, about which one must answer the question: does the
population of this territory constitute a people for purposes of self-
determination? In its classical version, self-determination was defined
in terms of existing territorial entities, which had sovereignty in the
name of the people populating them. Only in its earliest, Wilsonian
incarnation did self-determination dispense with pre-existing borders
in the name of a different organizing principle: ethnicity. During
decolonization, ethno-democratic self-determination was
subordinated to territorial pre-determination through the principle
of uti possidetis.47  By identifying colonies as the only entities whose
populations constituted peoples in a legally cognizable sense, classical
self-determination canonized the territorial imperative to the
exclusion of all other factors.
In Vojvodina, territorial bounds have changed radically, thus
making any statement about that territory’s people problematic.
Short-lived nineteenth century incarnations stretched well into
today’s Hungary and Romania.48  Today’s Vojvodina did not exist as
a political unit until after the Second World War. Vojvodina’s
demarcation does not correspond to any pre-existing boundaries.
The northern and eastern borders are entirely novel; parts of the
southern and western borders were international or internal borders
before the First World War, but they too were radically revised.49
Only a fraction of the boundary corresponds to any prior
demarcation. Many former colonies have older borders.
What can one conclude from the theory and evidence
concerning territory? Although theoretically a democratic right of
peoples, classical self-determination rested upon the essential
predominance of territory over people in formulating that right. Yet,
arguments about the sanctity of changing borders are difficult: What
is the value of a referendum on territory that has been reshaped, given
that borders affect electoral results? Can a state shape its territory to
preclude its people’s international right to self-determination? If so,
when did Vojvodina acquire a legally determined—and determining—
shape? What is Vojvodina, that it might define a people?
On this question, it seems, the Canadian Supreme Court has
gotten it right when it acknowledged that “people” and “population”
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are not the same. A “people” possessing the right to self-
determination must be analytically different from a group of
individuals defined only by their inclusion in a pre-existing territory.
Howsoever defined, the legal determination of a “people” must rest
on criteria external to the laws and processes of any particular
political system.
Constitutional Bases: Domestic Grounds for an International
Right?
Although self-determination is an international right, analogous
claims can be based on a state’s constitutional order. In the early
1990s, the European Union’s Badinter Commission50  relied on
Yugoslavia’s constitution to accord state-forming rights to the
republics, but not to provinces or the national peoples that made up
the population.51  Yet that was not the only possible decision. Kosovo
and Vojvodina first appeared as political entities in 1946: Kosovo as
an autonomous region and Vojvodina with a slightly more elevated
status as an autonomous province; by 1963, their constitutional
status had been harmonized and both were provinces, but they
remained powerless.52  In 1974, a new constitution expanded the
powers of the provinces.53  Both Vojvodina and Kosovo were given
broad autonomy, and were made effectively equal to a republic; each
province had a seat on the federal presidency and powers within the
federal structure as great as Serbia’s. Changes to Serbia’s own
constitution similarly expanded the power of the provinces against
Serbia, even giving them a veto over Serbian legislation which would
affect them. Vojin Dimitrijevic notes that
the autonomous provinces were, for all practical purposes,
promoted to the status of full-fledged federal sub-units…. [I]t was
at the level of such sub-units that nations and nationalities
realized their sovereign rights…. [T]he autonomous provinces were
listed, together with the republics, as constituent parts of
Yugoslavia. All this led to the widely accepted designation, by the
masters of jargon, of the autonomous provinces as “elements of
the federation.”54
Following Milosevic’s accession to power, Serbian constitutional
amendments effectively stripped both provinces of their autonomy;55
the new federal constitution of 1992 makes no mention of the
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provinces at all.
The status of self-determination, including secession, under the
1974 Constitution had been sharply contested in Yugoslav
scholarship and politics.56  The republics’ and nations’ right to self-
determination was acknowledged, but some argued it had been
perfected—and therefore extinguished—by joining Yugoslavia after
the Second World War.57  As one scholar writing in the mid-1980s
noted:
The general Yugoslav view is that Vojvodina and Kosovo are
republics in everything but name…. [They have] no legal claim to
the right of secession (a formality to which the [republics] are
theoretically entitled but which would only be an embarrassment
where the large and unreliable Albanian population in Kosovo is
concerned).58
That “formality,” of course, later became the lynchpin of the
international community’s decision to recognize new independent
states. The deep political and constitutional uncertainty surrounding
these questions within Yugoslavia hardly mattered in 1992, when the
Badinter Commission decided that only republics held state-forming
authority.59  Based on a reading of the constitution, they could have
chosen the nations and nationalities, or the provinces.60  The choice
was arbitrary and preferential. Given the indeterminacy of the
constitutional framework, it could hardly have been anything else.
That indeterminacy is magnified when interposed with
democratic majoritarian principles. Can a people’s rights—whether at
the international or at the state level—be in any way delimited by
constitutional changes to which it was not party in a meaningful
sense? From their creation, Kosovo and Vojvodina were the products
of a fundamentally non-democratic process; with their effective
extinction, they lost only a paper right to self-determination. Ought
one accord any political weight to that anti-democratic decision? On
the other hand, ought one support the previous autonomy, which
itself was not a democratic choice by the people, but only the product
of Communist Party desires?
The choice does not easily admit principled distinctions.
Instead, one picks an arbitrary baseline and sticks to it, as the
Badinter Commission did: “[O]ne cannot escape the impression that
the West supported the principle of self-determination in 1991-92,
but only on condition that the results of the original, fundamental,
non-self-determination be respected.”61  Any constitutional change
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not informed by the democratic ideals underlying self-determination
is suspect.
Of course, it might be argued that, although the 1974 Yugoslav
constitution fails the democratic test, a genuinely democratically
derived constitution could satisfy this concern, and thus could form
the basis for a legitimate international determination. Domestic and
international observers might readily agree on a group’s right to self-
determine if plainly defined in a document formulated in an open
and democratic fashion. By contrast, disgruntled citizens of a state
whose constitution was democratically derived might not legitimately
be able to assert a constitutional critique as the basis for exercising
self-determination.
Such an argument relies on the democratic currency of a
constitutional order. In reality, although there is a convenient legal
and philosophical fiction binding each citizen to the general polity by
a kind of contract, most constitutions are historical artifacts not
necessarily reflective of the current democratic wishes of the
population. Constitutions are often hard to change.62  Indeed, it is
precisely minority groups that will be least well positioned to effect
changes.
Certainly, if a constitution affords a particular grouping the
right to secede, that grouping may be able to assert its claim, but only
as an artifact of municipal law subject to international legal rules. It
could not exercise its right to the detriment of a people with a claim
to self-determination sounding in international law.63
Moreover, relying on the democratic nature of a constitution’s
derivation seems to beg the question: can a large, identifiable,
internally cohesive portion of a state’s population—whether ethnically
based or other—that has serious objections to an existing
constitutional order simply be ignored on the grounds that the
original constitutional construction was democratic?64  To suppose
so would simply invite the kind of facile conclusion that was reached
concerning Yugoslavia itself, namely that, regardless of the facts of
its formation, it had effectively dissolved into its republican units.65
It seems clear that constitutional analogies are very limited in scope,
because any constitutional dispensation, no matter how democratic,
is still subject to an independent and overriding analysis of the
international right and is silent on the nature of a people.
Indeed, this is an unsurprising result: a domestic constitution
cannot, by its own terms, create or modify what is an international
right. If some group can make out a claim to be a people in
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international law, its rights as a people are inalienable, and cannot be
bargained away in an ultimate sense. A constitution cannot define a
people, nor its rights.
Historical Bases: Tradition and Political Value
It may be argued that a pre-existing territorial claim is integral to
self-determination,66  an implicitly historical criterion. Serb
arguments on Kosovo, for instance, are historical.67  The West has not
let their logic trump the Albanians’ majoritarian position, yet takes
them into account when making its assessments.
In Vojvodina, historical bases are similarly invoked. One reason
Yugoslavia adopted a federal order was the privilege accorded to
[the] traditional, which means simply that people who have
traditionally enjoyed self-rule and who think of themselves as
different…may desire autonomy in order to safeguard their
distinct culture and interests… [T]he establishment of…Vojvodina
was…inspired by the distinct culture and group consciousness of
Vojvodina’s Serbian population as well as by…the Hungarian
minority.68
Hungarians, “old” Serbs, and others also assert historical provenance
for their claims against Serbian centralism—although Vojvodina has
never approached the mythic significance that Kosovo has for Serbs’
national iconography, or Translyvania for Hungarians’.
The problem with privileging history in analyzing self-
determination is the indeterminacy of historical claims. Whose claim
is the stronger, on what grounds? Moreover, any historical basis
becomes (hopelessly) intertwined with democratic and constitutional
bases, because subsequent events, even if initially illegitimate, can
vitiate an historical claim.
Historical bases suffer the same defects as territorial and
constitutional bases: asserted as rationales in their own right, they
make an ill fit with the dominant democratic imperative underlying
self-determination.69  Democratic analysis cannot give credence to
historical claims that disenfranchise contemporary citizens, as they
would have in Kosovo, and would in Vojvodina—and would in most
places where such claims are raised.
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Justice Bases: Alleviating Suffering or Vindicating Inalienable
Rights?
Perhaps the only viable ground for a claim that does not require a
democratic underpinning is a justice-based argument: extreme
violations of human rights can give grounds for exercising self-
determination.70  It is on these grounds that the greatest distance
between Kosovo and Vojvodina appears: Belgrade’s policies in Kosovo
have always been much more oppressive—leading, last year, to the
wholesale expulsion of Albanians from the province—while
Vojvodina remains peaceful.
If self-determination is a right, however, it is difficult to see how
it is limited to instances of extreme
oppression. The Quebec reference
suggests that the rationale for self-
determination has always been political
participation.71  Colonial emancipation was
rationalized by a desire to alleviate human
suffering, but it is impossible to
understand the universal scope of
decolonization by reference to empirical
instances of suffering. Some former
colonial populations are worse off today
in almost every way than they were before
independence; what these polities have
gained is the right to rule themselves,
within existing boundaries, without
exception and without reference to the nature of the alien rule.
Invoking a right to secede in the face of genocide, on the other
hand, is not an exercise of self-determination in its own right. It is the
use of self-determination as an instrument to prevent genocide. Rights
are not means. Political claims based on a need to alleviate suffering
are powerful, and can separate situations like Kosovo from
Vojvodina, but they do not have anything to do with the rationale
underlying self-determination itself. Self-determination cannot
consistently be detached from democracy.
Upon what then can one base a claim to self-determination?
Only justice claims have an independent basis, but they are
instrumental and not an exercise of right in itself. All the other bases
are interrelated: territory is an historical artifact, historical and
constitutional claims are confounded by democratic analysis, and
For now the
West will not
contemplate even
Kosovo’s indep-
endence, but
events there and
in Monten-egro
will change that.
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democratic claims depend on territorial dispensations. They cannot
be analyzed separately, yet their motivation cannot be described
synthetically. Like the Heisenberg principle, measuring self-
determination is an indeterminate act. In an environment of such
conceptual indeterminacy, the choice of a legal standard itself
becomes arbitrary and preferential; this creates room, and risks, for
policymakers seeking to justify their decisions. Vojvodina may soon
confront policymakers with an opportunity to make their policies fit
the rationales underlying self-determination.
The Unavoidable Analogy: Kosovo and Vojvodina, Policy and
Legal Rationales
Today Vojvodina is stable. The situation could change rapidly,
however, and depends on developments in Kosovo that will invite
parallel claims in Vojvodina.72  The West is deeply involved in the
Balkans. How will it respond to the inevitable challenge to apply its
policies consistently? Following is a list of outcomes for Kosovo and
Vojvodina, arranged on a spectrum from greatest intrusion on
Serbian sovereignty to least—not in order of likelihood. What legal
arguments could policymakers invoke to justify each outcome? How
will their choices in Kosovo constrain their choices in Vojvodina and
beyond?
Independence or Partition
For now the West will not openly contemplate even Kosovo’s
independence, but events there and in Montenegro will change that.73
When independence comes, it will make parallel moves in Vojvodina—
though unlikely—more difficult to oppose. Eventually, the West
might have to seek the proper legal register in which to voice its
acquiescence to new state formations on the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
The most likely response would be to adopt rhetoric like that
used in 1991 to justify recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, when
support for territorial integrity gave way to a legal finding that
Yugoslavia had dissolved. As then, the fact of dissolution would open
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to new claims by its constituent
elements which could form new states. A de facto independent
Vojvodina could petition for recognition on the theory that it
legitimately possessed state-forming power.
The additional step required here would be recognition of a
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successor right in the provinces as well as the republics. According to
the Badinter Commission, only republics acquired that right when
Yugoslavia collapsed, but because the republics’ right to secede was
anything but incontestable, it seems a small step to say that other
entities would have similar rights in a second dissolution.74
At present it would be difficult to claim that Serbia is in
dissolution, but if civil strife increased, it would be equally difficult
to explain why a claim could not be made. The West could then
choose: invoke dissolution to legitimate Vojvodina’s secession (as in
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia), or fail to invoke it so as to withhold
recognition from an undesirable claimant (as in northern Cyprus),
even if events seemed to compel recognition.
If only Hungarian areas sought independence, a different
justification would be needed, combining dissolution with
constitutional bases: dissolution could legitimate ethnic secession if
state-constituting power were identified in the nation instead of the
province, a finding the Yugoslav constitution supports with the
same certitude—or lack of it—that the Badinter Commission relied
upon.
The 1974 constitution identifies several sources of sovereignty:
working people, nations, and nationalities.75  As nationalities with
sovereignty similar to the nations,76  Albanians and Hungarians
could be claimants in a dissolution. If the West had to accede to
partition in Kosovo, it could rediscover enthusiasm for
Wilsonianism—a distinctively American product—to justify a
dispensation on national lines. Once it did, it might find it difficult
not to do the same in Vojvodina. The implications for expanding the
definition of self-determination, if such a precedent were followed, are
obvious. Indeed, the United States might stop apologizing for Wesley
Clark’s comments, and start praising them.
Territorial Autonomy
Only Hungarians advocate autonomy within Vojvodina. The analysis
underlying their proposal is difficult to square with Western practice,
but the Dayton Accords’ internal division of Bosnia on ethno-
territorial lines yields a precedent.
Rhetorical support for territorial autonomy would emphasize
Wilsonian values, drawing additional support from justice-based
arguments that autonomy will prevent oppression. There are no
existing borders to delimit an ethnic claim. But, if Kosovo is internally
partitioned between Serbs and Albanians—or rather, if the current
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effective partition were cemented in law—a similar division in
Vojvodina would seem more possible, because precedents of ethnic
partition in Bosnia and Kosovo would be available, and undeniable.
If accomplished through means of a plebescite, perhaps in the guise
of municipal elections, it could support the trend in advocacy
supporting internal self-determination, though with an obvious
ethnic underlay not normally appreciated by advocates of
democratization.
Restored Autonomy
The preferred Western policy in Kosovo is “restoration” of
autonomy, with protections for Serbs, an international presence, and
an undefined final status. Any such solution will generate swift calls
for a similar dispensation in Vojvodina.
Rhetorical support for autonomy, in Kosovo or Vojvodina,
would center on two bases: that autonomy prevents injustice, and
that the pre-1990 regime legitimates “restored” autonomy. Since the
West supports autonomy but not independence, policymakers would
stress selective elements of the old order: “clear” pre-1990
constitutional proscriptions against self-determination would be
extolled, while equally “clear” constitutional restrictions on autonomy
imposed in 1990 would be excoriated for infringing provincial
sovereignty. (It would be difficult to advocate restoration on
democratic grounds, since the original autonomy itself was not
democratically derived; self-determination’s democratic aims hardly
justify re-instituting a non-democratic dispensation.)
These arguments, if applied in Kosovo, could also support
Vojvodina’s autonomy. (A variant, republican status, is currently
rejected by Albanians as too little, and by Serbs as a violation of
Serbia’s integrity, but if Kosovo were granted republican status, the
pressure for a parallel option in Vojvodina would be considerable.)
Indeed, the West would find it difficult to explain in what respect the
two provinces were different, and would have to rely on justice
arguments to suggest, in effect, that Vojvodina had not suffered
enough to overturn a constitutional order that had already been
declared illegitimate in Kosovo. Either course would bolster the
prominence of domestic constitutional analysis in future evaluations
of self-determination, much as the Quebec Reference has done.
Likewise, reliance on either constitutional or justice-based arguments
would accentuate the role of ethnicity, which underlay the original
constitutional dispensation and the differential treatment of the two
provinces.
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Status Quo
How would the West justify a new dispensation in Kosovo without
any change in Vojvodina? As it did with Chechnya, the West might
simply assert that a state’s internal structures are its own business.
However, in light of its intense involvement in Serbia’s internal
structures during the Kosovo conflict, such a response would seem
too hypocritical to stand alone.
The differentiation would therefore be made on the basis of just
treatment. In Kosovo, autonomy has been presented as a solution to
a human rights problem, not an exercise of self-determination.
Policymakers could de-emphasize the democratic bases for
arrangements in Kosovo, stressing instead that measures were taken
to alleviate suffering—the instrumentalities of self-determination used
for other ends. Vojvodina, they would say, does not justify
intervening—thus avoiding the need to intervene, but also refining
the standard for evaluating future claims.
Repressive Measures by Serbia
If the Serbian leadership duplicated its brutality in Vojvodina,
however, Western policymakers would confront a choice concerning
both their policy and their legal posture. Most likely they would say
enough is enough, and declare that if we had a moral obligation to
the Kosovars, we have the same obligation to the peoples of
Vojvodina.
If they acquiesced, however, they would have to justify inaction.
They might protest their inability to act, but their prior engagement
would make such a defense look unprincipled. Instead, there would
be incentives to define the problem as not rising to international
cognizance, the way the Clinton administration sought desperately
to avoid saying Rwanda was suffering a genocide.
Constitutional, historical, and territorial rationales would ill
serve to distinguish the cases, but policymakers could adopt a dual
argument to downplay the parallels. First, they might invoke justice
arguments, suggesting that conditions were not as bad in Vojvodina
as in Kosovo. Second, they could distinguish the ethnic dynamic,
noting that Kosovo involved oppression of one ethnic group by
another, while oppression in Vojvodina would affect the Serb
majority too.77  This could limit the precedential effect of Kosovo for
Vojvodina, but it would inevitably re-cast the conflict—and its
resolution—in explicitly ethnic terms.
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The Post-Colonial Moment of Law’s (In)Determination
What, then, can we say about the prospects for novel self-
determination claims in Vojvodina and more broadly? The issue is
international, not domestic, because self-determination is interpreted
in the international arena.78  The international community has many
legal and rhetorical approaches at its disposal. To understand which
interpretation it is likely to choose, we must consider how it has
responded to previous calls for self-determination, and how that
response is changing.
Reinterpreting Self-Determination
Self-determination had been successfully asserted many times in the
last half century, but only in the colonial context. In that period, the
doctrine seemed a relatively straightforward calculation, because it
was cabined into a narrow, formalistic set of rules applied only to
colonies. In practice, while declaring it a radical majoritarian-
democratic principle, the international community reserved the name
self-determination for a narrow set of power transfers within existing
territorial boundaries. Ethnically based expressions—different
majorities—were not favored.
The justifications—and the justice of the cause—seemed self-
evident. But in the cool post-colonial evening of the post-Cold War
world, the certainties of that time look uncomfortably like
convenience. Reduced to a rule, self-determination was easy to
calculate, but hard to motivate. If the polestar was opposition to
oppression, then why only in colonies? If democratic participation,
then why not in former colonies too? If self-determination was a
universal right, why was it only absolute in colonies, and subject to
deconstruction or tests of genocidal oppression everywhere else?
These questions only arise because the reasoning that should
underlie the rousing cry of self-determination—Wilson’s reasoning—
was stripped from the doctrine. Wilson’s troubled but principled
assertion that peoples were what mattered remains the motive and
rhetorical force for the doctrine. Classical colonial self-determination
reversed Wilson’s concept, letting the territory determine the people.
This reversal could be ignored, because everyone agreed that local
governance was preferable to metropolitan dominion. In the process,
however, the doctrine became rigidly restricted to a rule that no
longer responded to its original rationale. 79
Yet, de facto assertions of self-determination have occurred
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under other names. The legal use of the term secession has been
avoided by asserting the “consensual” nature of the division (as in
Bangladesh, Eritrea, and the Soviet Union) or by using the motif of
dissolution. Proofs, even intimations, of a domestic right to secede
have been favored to legitimate division of states. Soviet and Yugoslav
republics were said to have a right to leave their unions based on
“clear” domestic constitutional provisions. Yet, these instances could
also be understood as invoking an international right, a halting return
to the original premise of self-determination. The likely independence
of Kosovo, although it will come under the cover of a referendum or
a round-table negotiation, will further strain the convention that self-
determination finds expression only in the colonial context or within
the confines of existing states.
There is evidence of a formal conceptual expansion as well. The
Quebec Reference allows a “people” to be defined other than by a pre-
determined territory. In effect, it returns Wilsonian self-
determination to the legitimate center of the interpretive debate.
Impolitic as Wesley Clark’s statements were at the time, they may
prove prescient.
The Challenge for Policy
In this context, modes of legal analysis are multiple, selection among
them preferential, and outcomes indeterminate. States have
considerable latitude to reach legal conclusions that comport with
their policy preferences. Yet, law is not merely the instrument and
policy the master. Acts of legal definition do matter at the margin. It
would have been less acceptable to impose an embargo on Yugoslavia
if the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia had been characterized as civil
war, for example. The characterization of the conflict as international
was a preferential legal posture, not simply a consequence of one’s
political or moral view, since “the definition of [those] wars as civil
could not and would not conceptually [have] prevent[ed] anyone
from denouncing the warring sides and their allies.”80
Law may indeed have an independent effect within such
calculations, making certain options more presentable and more
possible. States do not wish to be seen as inconsistent, and may prefer
certain arguments—even certain policies—to avoid being caught out.
They are constrained by legal argument because they are not
pursuing a single outcome on a single occasion; policy has a temporal
dimension which limits the range of positions an actor is able to hold
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legitimately.81
Indeed, it is only because the classical conception of self-
determination has weakened that groups can again assert claims in
places like Yugoslavia. As long as the classical doctrine held, self-
determination was only for colonial peoples’ territories. Only in a
moment of significant doctrinal indeterminacy does the range of
rhetorical postures broaden, giving states
leeway to make new law comporting with
their preferences, law which in turn
defines future possibilities.
Because those possibilities are still
very much in the making, our choices will
matter. The international community is
not wrong to advocate internal self-
determination, but it is unduly sanguine
about democracy’s present attractions,
because it assumes that external self-
determination has run its course.
Sidetracked as it was early on, and replaced with a totemic invocation
subverted by the decolonizing project, external self-determination
has not nearly fulfilled its original potential, nor satisfied its
claimants long denied. Critics who see a principled response to those
claims as threatening to liberal democratic values82  are misguided.
For until external self-determination does run its course, the
prospects for that other goal of self-determination, the fuller
flowering of democracy, will be limited indeed.83
It has been an implicit purpose of this paper to explore the
transformative interaction of a seemingly settled doctrine and
discrete acts of policymaking. On its own, our present case in no way
can create a new Wilsonian orthodoxy—with its vision of external and
internal self-determination for peoples. But because it brings to the
fore an essential criterion of self-determination, which law has long
denied and policy ignored, we may see in it something of the way
forward: policymakers seeking to limit the precedential effects of
Kosovo for Vojvodina will need to stress the uniqueness of each case.
Inevitably, however, efforts to distinguish Kosovo from Vojvodina
will have to address the different ethnic makeup of the provinces
which underlies their different treatment. A too strenuous effort to
isolate Kosovo’s dispensation from other claims for self-
determination, in Yugoslavia or elsewhere, will compel policymakers
to acknowledge that an ethnic criterion has definitively re-entered the
Like the Heis-
enberg principle,
measuring self-
determination is
an indeterminate
act.
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legal analysis. As, indeed, it has.
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